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A Response to “‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility’:  
Privileged Students’ Conceptions of Justice- Oriented Citizenship”
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Abstract
Faced with the facts of economic inequality, the wealthy are confronted with a particular set of moral, 
social, and political questions, not least of which is the question of how to preserve a sense of being a 
“good” human being. In the case of justifying privilege, the problem becomes how to position oneself 
as being uniquely able to enact a superior moral character. In this response to Swalwell’s article, we 
argue that her data show how being good and having moral standing is a social outcome that is pre-
mised on the unequally distributed ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize 
particular discourses. Swalwell demonstrated the complicated ways in which privileged students 
understand what it means to have a commitment to social justice, and her analysis raises questions 
about the possibility of as well as the potential for educating students with economic privilege toward 
social justice commitments. In this response we highlight the important symbolic role that economi-
cally disadvantaged groups play in the imaginary of students who attend elite private schools and 
what this illustrates about the ways in which they are complicit in sustaining social inequality.
This article is a response to:
Swallwell, K. (2013). With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: Privileged Students’ Conceptions 
of Justice- Oriented Citizenship. Democracy & Education, 21(1). Article 5. Available online at http://
democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol21/Iss1/5.
Late at night, with TV’s hungry child;
his belly swells.
Well, for the price of a coke, or a smoke,
I could keep alive those hungry eyes.
Man, take a look again;
everyday things change, oh,
but basically you and me stay the same.
— “Seek Up,” Dave Matthews
The United States of America was founded on an 
antiaristocratic conception of democracy based on equal opportu-
nity. Yet the fact that social and economic advantages enable some 
people to both further and ensure their economic wealth runs 
against the most basic assumption of such a conception, that those 
who succeed do so out of their own skill and hard work. When 
doubts arise about such assumptions, the wealthy are faced with the 
task of convincing everyone— especially themselves— of the 
legitimacy of their class interests in order to preserve their power. 
To do this, the wealthy are confronted with a particular set of 
moral, social, and political questions, not least of which is the 
question of how to preserve a sense of being a “good” human being. 
In the case of justifying privilege, the problem becomes how to 
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position oneself as being uniquely able to enact a superior moral 
character. What is more complicated and must remain hidden is 
that the very ability to enact good citizenship and moral character 
is premised on the economic and social advantages that such 
enactments justify. Being good and having moral standing is a 
social outcome that is premised on the unequally distributed 
ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize 
particular discourses.
It may seem counterintuitive that economically advantaged 
individuals would be concerned with and committed to social and 
economic justice, since they are the ones who benefit most from 
inequality. Since social justice efforts are commonly understood as 
a challenge to economically privileged groups in order to increase 
the representation and empowerment of oppressed groups, it 
might seem strange that people with economic privilege would 
support such efforts. Such commitments might seem even stranger 
if we consider that people with economic privilege often have 
limited opportunities for direct contact and experiences with 
individuals outside of their class context. They also tend to lack an 
analysis of their own privilege and how it is related to the oppres-
sion suffered by disadvantaged groups (Stuber, 2010; Wildman, 
1996). In fact, individuals with economic privilege have little 
awareness of economic oppression and sometimes deny that it 
even exists, instead blaming the poor for their circumstances 
(Johnson, 2001; Lazarre, 1996; Sleeter, 2000). While these various 
factors could easily support the ostensibly common sense assump-
tion that privileged people are unlikely to support social justice 
efforts, what is more interesting is the fact that they often do. 
Indeed, in so- called capitalist democracies like the United States, a 
commitment to the improvement of the lives of the disadvan-
taged— at least in rhetoric— is crucial to the public image of 
economically privileged groups.
These commitments are not always understood as social 
justice, a phrase that is often associated with leftist and progressive 
politics. At the same time, because justice and being just have a 
common genealogy with notions of being right and moral author-
ity, justifying privilege is always wrapped within a conception of 
justice and moral character. Understanding how economically 
privileged individuals make sense of justice in general and social 
justice in particular reveals a great deal about their self- 
construction as “good” people. An analysis of privilege reveals a 
great deal about how much privilege is defined through its lack. 
The wealthy need the poor, not only because their abundance in 
part produces poverty but also because the poor play a critical 
symbolic and affective role in how the wealthy understand 
themselves. Like the hungry African child on the television who 
must be kept alive for the entertainment of late- night infomercial 
viewers across the United States, the poor must be kept poor so that 
the rich always have someone upon whom to enact their self- 
righteousness.
It is here that Swalwell’s analysis in her article (2013), “‘With 
Great Power Comes Great Responsibility’: Privileged Students’ 
Conceptions of Justice- Oriented Citizenship,” sheds some fascinat-
ing light. Exploring how privileged adolescents respond to 
educational efforts encouraging them to become justice oriented 
reveals a great deal about the fact that equity and justice are 
important themes in the self- construction of some wealthy elites. 
Swalwell demonstrated the complicated— although not all that 
surprising— ways in which these privileged students understand 
what it means to have a commitment to social justice. Her analysis 
raises questions about the possibility of as well as the potential for 
educating students with economic privilege toward social justice 
commitments.
Implied throughout Swalwell’s article is the assumption that 
to be justice oriented, whatever it entails, is one way in which 
individuals demonstrate their “good moral character.” The assump-
tion that to be a “good citizen” is also to be a “good person” is 
embedded in the framework of civic education through which she 
examined these students’ conceptions of social justice. Surely one 
would expect privileged individuals who identify as justice 
oriented, as do the adolescents in Swalwell’s study, to express 
concern for others’ interests. Yet what stands out from the data 
presented is the students’ concern with presenting themselves as 
good people with good moral character.
As both of us have demonstrated elsewhere, part of what 
motivates privileged adolescents to engage in benevolent acts, 
especially community service activities, is the ability to present 
themselves to others as caring, engaged, and generous (Howard, 
2010). Their involvement in benevolent acts serves not only as a 
useful way of forming a more positive self- image but also has 
considerable ideological value in diverting attention away from 
their privileged circumstances. Their benevolent acts place them in 
a positive light while serving to protect, rationalize, and legitimize 
their advantages (Gaztambide- Fernández, 2011). More specifically, 
these youths use a variety of ideological frames and operations in 
describing their involvement in community service to rationalize 
their schooling and life advantages, construct between- class 
divisions, and establish within- class solidarity.
Again, this is not to say that the students interviewed by 
Swalwell do not care for those who suffer from the consequences of 
economic inequality and are simply motivated by a rational 
calculation to present themselves as good people. Rather, what we 
want to underscore here is the important symbolic role that 
economically disadvantaged groups play in the imaginary of 
students who attend elite private schools such as Kent Academy. 
While we value Swalwell’s argument regarding the disjuncture 
between the aims of justice- oriented programs and how the 
students themselves understand their own commitments to social 
justice, we want to suggest that such a disjuncture is not only 
unsurprising but also predictable. These differing views of what it 
means to be justice oriented share in common the fact that they are 
all manifestations of the ways in which the complicity of economi-
cally advantaged students is deferred to the very moment in which 
they declare a commitment to social justice, however construed. At 
that moment, and particularly in the context of an elite school 
committed to social justice, the suffering of the poor becomes the 
fodder through which these students enact a sense of moral 
standing. Gaztambide- Fernández (2009a) argued that such 
“deferred complicity” becomes evident in those cathartic moments 
when our sense of what it means to be a “normal” person is 
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reflected back to us through an oblique recognition of “other 
people’s suffering” (p. 41).
Each of the “performative identities” that Swalwell described 
provides evidence of the ways in which the poor constitute a key 
signifier through which the wealthy justify their own privilege and 
come to see themselves as good people. First, for those who espouse 
a meritocratic outlook, other people’s suffering is a confirmation 
that they are worthy of their privilege because they worked hard. 
Positioning themselves as part of the solution through acts of 
charity, the meritocratic logic mobilizes other people’s suffering as a 
way to construct a self that is caring, knowledgeable, and cosmo-
politan. At the most egregious level, knowledge of other peoples’ 
suffering becomes material for sounding “really cool,” as one 
student put it (p. 5), and for appearing informed and well educated. 
Second, the Benevolent Benefactor frame positions elites as the 
moral authority, “as a model toward which those with less should 
strive,” as Swalwell explained (p. 6). Such “benefactors” confirm 
their status by engaging in acts that corroborate their superiority 
over those without privilege, without whom benevolence— as part 
of what it means to be a good person— cannot be enacted. The poor, 
of course, can never achieve such moral standing, precisely because 
what defines them as poor is the lack of the very economic 
resources that allow wealthy benefactors to enact their moral 
character.
In the third instance, the very possibility of “opting out”  
(p. 5), as one participant put it, and becoming resigned to the fact of 
inequality in the comfort of an elite school is an option that only 
economic privilege can afford. As Nietzsche (1996) argued, the kind 
of ascetic ideal expressed through the image of someone like Henry 
David Thoreau is itself the product of a process of moral self- 
constitution that further obscures the power of economic privilege. 
Such a position is not all that surprising. Even when people from 
privileged groups have an awareness of oppression and see the need 
for social justice work, they may feel that it is useless to try to 
change things or that there is little they can do. They may feel 
inadequate, powerless, overwhelmed, or hopeless to bring about 
change (Goodman, 2001). Such feelings are akin to the kind of 
paralyzing “White guilt” that many Whites experience when they 
become aware of how they are implicated in racism and benefit 
from White supremacy. And like White guilt, the move toward 
resignation once again underscores the economic privilege implied 
in having that option.
At the opposite end of the Resigned, Swalwell described the 
frame of the Activist Ally as the one that “is best suited” (p. 7) to the 
conception of justice- oriented citizenship that Westheimer and 
Kahne (2004) argued is most consistent with a social justice 
education. Clearly this is Swalwell’s preferred position, and the one 
she wants to promote as the desirable outcome of a social justice 
education for students with economic privilege. We do not 
necessarily disagree, but we want to caution that such a frame is not 
innocent and is also implied in the kind of deferred (while differed) 
complicity in other people’s suffering that is more evident in the 
previous frames. The students who embrace this frame describe a 
desire for being with the people, talking to and getting to know the 
poor and their needs. Once again, such desires are wrapped in a 
conception of the wealthy as moral and deserving, which requires 
suffering others (i.e., “the people”) as a way to enact “good citizen-
ship.” In a sense, this is articulated at the level of the school, since 
the very reputation of the Kent Academy as a justice- oriented, elite, 
private school rides on the fact that it caters to the academic, social 
and, in the end, moral needs of those who can afford to attend such 
a school. This is not really paradoxical, as Swalwell suggested; the 
school, and its students, builds an identification as a “good school” 
and as “good citizens” on the backs of the very people whose lives 
they presumably want to change but without whom they would 
have no referent for self- definition. The hungry child must be kept 
alive, “but basically you and me stay the same.”
Swalwell seemed to project her own hopes on the words of 
students like Dylan and Cora, and in doing so ended up claiming 
more than the data make apparent, suggesting that they engage in 
practices informed by “an iterative relationship between thinking 
and doing that loops knowledge and understanding with action”  
(p. 7). Yet we know nothing about whether and how these students 
actually do anything to practice what they seem to preach or 
whether and how anything they do yields “mutual transformation 
and societal improvement” (p. 6). We can assume, however, that 
their college applications will be filled with statements about their 
concern for the well- being of others as they craft the kind of 
admissions profile that will yield an equally elite college education 
(Stevens, 2007; see also Gaztambide- Fernández, 2011).
Brantlinger (2003) pointed out that in democracies, “domi-
nant groups must have some degree of permission from subordi-
nates to exert control over them; that consensus is achieved by 
circulating ideologies that obfuscate the rankings and power imbal-
ances that work against equity for peripheral groups” (pp. 5– 6). 
This projection of self as justice oriented, therefore, has consider-
able ideological value— in diverting attention away from the power 
of dominant groups and convincing subordinates that they are 
concerned for others and are compassionate, kind, and giving. Such 
ideological messages that place the wealthy in a positive light 
protect their class interests and power, raising questions about 
whether and how individuals with economic privilege can ever be 
effectively involved in social justice efforts and what their role 
should be. On the one hand, it may be that providing access to the 
economic resources necessary to support social justice efforts is 
reason enough to persist in instilling justice- oriented values on 
young elites (Brantlinger, 2003; Goodman, 2001). On the other 
hand, if providing such resources only serves to reinforce the 
hierarchical positioning of wealthy elites as morally superior and as 
capable of enacting the ultimate form of good citizenship by 
becoming allies with the poor, fundamental social change is highly 
unlikely.
Swalwell noted that there are also subjective reasons why 
economically privileged students should engage in social justice 
work and embrace an “activist ally” conception of citizenship. 
“Improving their own lives” (p. 6) is part of what is at stake for these 
privileged youths as they are also “dehumanized by injustice” (p. 7). 
We agree that inequality and economic oppression have a deleteri-
ous effect on everyone involved. However, we are suspicious of the 
conceptions of what it means to be human that are reinforced when 
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elites enact a particular version of “good citizenship” by engaging 
in social justice work. Seeking self- improvement through what 
Chouliaraki (2011) called “ironic” solidary efforts runs the risk of 
becoming “a matter of crafting artful stories that situate the self at 
the heart of their communicative structure” (p. 370). While 
ostensibly about activism, such efforts really have at stake the 
moral salvation of economically privileged individuals without any 
significant change in the very material conditions that enable them 
to engage as allies in the first place.
In some sense, what this means is that we need to pay particu-
lar attention to what we mean by activism when we examine 
privileged individuals’ commitments toward social justice. This is 
especially important given that there is always an element of 
asserting oneself in activism by assuming roles based on the sense 
of entitlement that elites internalize through their schooling 
(Gaztambide- Fernández, 2009b). Unless economically privileged 
individuals are willing to examine their sense of entitlement and 
challenge their own privileged ways of knowing and doing, being 
in solidarity with less fortunate others will remain about improving 
themselves. At an institutional level, this means that schools like 
the Kent Academy would have to put their very reputations— along 
with their economic privilege— on the line by becoming not just 
more diverse, as Swalwell suggested, but by shifting the very fabric 
of privilege that clothes their elite reputations.
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